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.  2 I.  INTRODUCTION 
Energy  is  a· very  important  element  of economic  activity  and  social  welfare. 'The 
creation of a single energy market based on open and competitive markets represents 
a great challenge for the Union as it is envisaged to have a direct impact on European 
industry and consumers welfare. 
First,  the introduction of competition in. the electricity and  gas sectors is  a means  to 
enhance the competitiveness of  the European industry competing in the world markets. 
One of the critical factors for the international .competitivene-ss of European business is 
the. cost of energy. Compared to USA or Australia,, European industry in  some cases 
pays 40% more for electricity and gas due to isolation of national markets and lack of 
intra-Community  trade  for  these  products.  The  competitive  disadvantage  of higher 
prices is particularly marked for the energy intensive industry such as steel, paper, glass 
and  motor vehicle· industries.  In the most energy-intensive sectors such  as  chemicals 
and aluminium, energy can account for 60% of production costs.  It is  evident that the 
survival  and  growth  of these  industries  in  the  EU  depends  on  their  ability  to  cut 
p~oductions costs, including energy costs.  A single electricity competitive market will 
also result in  an improvement of the standards of service to the benefit of consumers. 
as the utilities will be exposed to competitive pressure  · 
Second,  the  creation of a  single  market will  also  strengthen  the  security  of supply 
across the EU by permitting diversification and flexibility of supplies as a result of the 
closer integration of the .internal energy markets.  It will  provide for more outlets and 
better interconnections in the EU  · 
Third, the internal energy market is  likely to have positive effects on the environment. 
For instance,  liberalisation will  facilitate in  all Member States a switch over to cleaner 
energy sources for electricity generation such as gas; the operation of a single market 
·will lead  to less waste of natural  resources as  less reserve capacity will  be needed  in 
-each c;ountry,  and  the single market .will offer. the possibility to energy consumers to 
choose cleaner energy sources. To. ensure that these· positive effects are not mitigated 
by the im-pact of  more competitive prices on energy consumption, energy saving  etfo~ts 
should be maintained. 
Over the  last  years  very  important steps  have  been  taken to create a  single  energy 
market for the EU. Following the unanimous adoption of the electricity Directive
1 on 
December  t 996,  its· implementation  has  been now completed  in  'the  majority  of the 
Meinber States.  The Directive lays down rules for allowing real  competition between 
electricity producers while allowing an increasing number of consumers a free choice 
of their electricity  suppliers.  While  providing  for  the  liberalisati9n  of the  electricity 
markets, it gives special emphasis to public  services by providing the mechanisms to 
pursue public service considerations in the context of  a competitive market. 
1  Directive on common rules for the internal market in electricity 96/92/EC OJ L 27 o£30.01.1997  . 
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Th~: Dir··L·1.·tivc·:  pi·ovidi .. tg- ;;n  intL·i·nal  markl'l  ft,r  natural  gas  has  lwt~n adopll'd  on  2~ 
.lunt•  I  ()()H  l\1l'rnhcr  Stalt'S  shnt~ld imt)knwnt  it  hv  :\ll~llsl  .~llllll  It  pt1n  i~l~·s  II''  the 
v• adual  upcuj11g  uf t  h'-~  riatur al  gas mar kct  to t:ompct!t!on  over <t ten  year  period  to 
· reetch  33o/o of  the totalgas consumption.  .  ·  · 
Th~se Directives  ha.ve  provided the foundations for  the creation of a  single 'energy 
market: They have transformed  the conditions under which electricity and  gas trade 
will  be Cfirried  out in  the future with  a  view  to  lead  to significant  price  reductions 
across  the  EU,  to· enhanced  efficiency  and  to  improved  security  of supply.  To 
appreciate  the  progress  already ·achieved,  one  has ·to  look at  the  picture  of the 
electricity  and  gas  markets  some  years  ago  .. In  the  past  there  ~as no  trade  fl.1r 
electricity and gas between the Memper States of the EU and often no  competition 
even  within  the  Member  States  except  for ·certain  countries  like  the UK and  the 
Scandinavian . countries,  which  have  started  the  liberalisation  process  before  the 
adoption of  the Directive. Electricity and gas generation, transmission and distribution 
were  dominated .by  monopolies ..  Consumers  inevitably  had  no· choice of electricity_ 
supplies,  and  no guarantee for service standards.  European energy. intensive industry 
. for  which  electricity  represented  .a  considerable  cost  was . put· at ·competitive 
disadvantage, as electricity prices across Europe.were higher than in  other areas of  the 
·World. t•ur1hcrmorc. the foreclosure.ofnational markets to competition-has lead in  the 
past  to signiticant  price differences  in  different  countries and  even  within  individual 
Member States as the fbi! owing table illustrates:  · 
Figure 1: Pri(<>~ for el~ctrkit•1  dCro~s the E:U 
idorne~tit: ronsurnr.rs of JJOO kWh) 
. 
2  Dircctivc"98/30/EC, OJ L  204 of21.07.98  .. 
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figure 2: Prices for el&tricity acro$s theW 
(indumial (OJ1Sumr.rs of 50 GWh) ·~  2. 
The establishment  of a  single  legislative  framework applicable  to  all  tifteen  national 
electr:icity and gas systems was a very delicate task.  In the electricity sector,' there were 
highly centralised systems, such as those of  France and "Italy.  There were, furthermore,  · 
countries which  had  already undergone the liberalisation  process.  In  the gas sector, 
exporting countries· such as the UK and the Netherlands have  different  systems  and 
interests than importing countries and  countries such as Portugal  an·d  Greece which · 
had  introduced  gas rather  recently.  Market structures  also  varied. enormously  fro~ 
wuntry to country  .. The Directives providing for the liberalisation of  the electricity arid 
gas markets have set the framework for the creation of a single market for electricity 
and gas by allowing, over a peripd of  time, consumers to choose their suppliers, and by 
providing for competition amongst producers.  These  Directives were based on  three 
basic principles: 
•  First,  the introduction of competition while respecting public· service objectives to 
ensure an ·adequate and  reliable  supply of electricity ,and  gas which  is  of utmost 
i111portancc to all economic activity and households. 
•  Second, the gradual introduction of comi?etition to t,he  electricity and gas markets 
to give the necessary time to the industry to adjust to the new environment. 
•  Third,  the  Directives do  not impose  a  rigid  system  to  all  Member  States.  They 
rather  provide  the framework  fo.r  the creation  of a  single  market  while  leaving 
Member States a wide degree of  discretion to adopt the system whrch is best suited 
to their particular circumstances. 
It is evident that this only a start and much remains to be done for the completion. of  an 
internal energy market. Ultimately, the success of liberalisation will depend on a series 
of measures that need to be taken during the corning months which will  ensure that  .  . 
intra-Community trade is easily carried out. In this respect the creation of a number of 
trade facilitating mechanisms is essential together with the supervision of the operation 
ofthe mar,kets in  practice. 
2.1  IMPLEMENTATION THROUGHOUT THE EU- STATE OF PLAY 
2. l.l  Electricity Generation 
Generation is one of  the main components in the C<?St  of  electricity. This cost needs to 
be  significantly  reduced  if EU  prices  are  to  fall  to  those  of some  of its  main 
competitors. The Directive introduces full  and complete competition across the EU for 
all  new generating capacity.  Thus,  from February  1999,  any  producer will  be able  to 
. build a new power plant and generate electricity 11nywhere in the Community, either on 
·  the basis of an  authorisation system or a tendering procedure.  The Directive permits 
Member  States  to  choose  between  these  two  procedures  when  iinplementing  the 
Directive.  Under an  authorisation ·procedure,  any  company may  build  and  operate a 
new generation plant,  provided that it  complies with the planning and· energy supply 
5 
• 
\  I . , 
I  ~· 
( 
i 
.. 
'  ·'  ·,1. 
l 
ci:it~ria  tc>r authorisation  specified  in  the  Mernber  State  in  question.  Altenu\tively, 
under a tendering procedure, whe_never there is a necessity for new generation capacity  -
. or_1  the basis of  regular long-term planning t()recasts, an ind~pendent body will draw up 
an  inventory tor new means of production and the requisite capacity will  be· allocated 
by  a tendering procedure.  Thus,  the monopolies existing until  now in  many Member 
States for electricity generation will be exposed to com,petition . 
Whilst  the.  Directive  provides  the  ch~ice  for  Member  States  between  these  two 
· . approaches for introducing competition into electricity generation, it is becoming clear 
· . that almost all  Member States have opted or will  opt for the authorisation procedure . 
lor the construction of new generation capacity. The reason for this trend developing 
in  the  EU. is  that  this  procedure. represents  the  most.  transparent . and  effective 
mechanism to  open up electricity generation to competition. 
2.1.2  ·Opening up of the markets 
In  order to.  create a competitive market that works in  practice,  ~ufficient numbers of' 
co.nsumers have to be free to purchase electricity from the.supplier of  their choice. On 
the  other  hand,  liberalisation  has  to_  take  place  progressively.·  The· change  to 
competition  require~ major restructuring,  ne-w  trading systems and -mechanisms to be 
··put into  place~ and time for companies to adapt to the new competitive environment. 
The Directive balances these two objectives, requiring Member States to progressively 
open their markets in three st~g;es: 26% on 19.02.99, 28% ·at 2000 an·d 33% in 2003. 
· However,, Member  State.s .  have  committed  themselves  to  open  up  their  electricity 
mar_kets  .more  than  this  minimum  requirement. -Countries  like  the  UK,  Germany, 
Sweden and Finland are committed to 1  00% market opening.  Denmark. by'permitting. 
all  distributors to purchase freely is indirectly opening up 90% of its electricity market 
to competition. Others have also decided to go further than the basic requirements of 
the  Directive,  notably  the  Netherlands  and  Spain  which  will  open  up  33%  upon 
.  . 
implementation  gradually· increasing  to. reach  I  00%  by  2007,  Austria  27%  upl1n 
implementation  to  reach  50%  by  2003,  and  Italy  30% ·upon implementation.  As  a 
result,  more than.' 60% of total EU electricity  dem~xid will  be liberalised according to 
-cxislil)g  plans and  more than  nearly  two thirds of consumers will  be able to choose 
their' supplier. .  .  -
6 
I~ .• This  is  illustrated  in  the  following  graphic.  The  first  bar gives  the  opening  of the 
markets on the day ·the Directive has to be  implemented by  the Member States.  The 
second gives the situation that  according to  current  plans of the  Member States will 
exist  in  2007.  Nevertheless it  appears highly  likely  that  in  reality  liberalisation  will  in 
fact have progressed ev~n further by this date. 
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2.1.3  A.ccess to the network 
p  B  Al..lS  F  IRL  GR 
To  enable  the  transport  of electricity  from  producers  to  eligible  customers,  the 
· Directive  requires  the  owners . and  operators  of  the  electricity  .networks,  the 
Transmission  System  Operators  and  the Distribution  System  Operators,  to  provide 
access  to .their lines  to others.  The Directive  provides  three  alternative  methods of 
·achieving this:  regulated ·third party access, negotiated third party access, or the single 
buyer model.  In  fact,  all  Member States have opted for regulated or negotiated third 
party access ("TPA"): no country will  significantly use the Single Buyer model.  Access 
to transport wires can only be refused when there is  hot enough  c~pacity to transport 
the electricity or when transport .would make it  impossible to carry out public service 
obligations. 
It is generally considered that the system ofregulated third party access on the basis or 
published  prices is  the method of permitting· access to  th'e  network that  will  produce 
'the most effective competitive market Not only does the system of  fixed  prices for  all 
ensure  that  discrimination  against  competitors  cannot  take  place,  it  ensures  that 
companies can plan future electricity purchases with advance knowledge of  transparent 
tariffs.  To have to renegotiate access prices and conditions at the end of each contract 
is  also  an  extra .burden  on  the· companies.  Regulated  TPA  is  the  option  that  most 
Member States have chosen as the table below illustrates: 
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/)enmark has indicated that it will chan?,e to R'f'PA 
2.1 A  Unbundling 
'·  . 
;': 
In  Europe,  the  transmission .network  i~  largely  owned  by  a  vertically  integrated 
·electricity company,  that generates,  transports and  sells  electricity_,  These. companies 
. own an  ~·essential. service",  the transmission  network,  which,  under the new  rules,  it 
must otTer on equal terms to its owi1  company, and to its competitors. However, there 
· is in  reality a  clear risk that such companies will be tempted to discriminate in favour of 
their  own  group  companies  when. granting  access  to  th~  network.  To  prevent · 
discrimination. occ-urring  the  Directive  requires  Member States to  take three  basic 
measures: .  (i) ensuring· management unbundling of the transmission  system operator, 
· (iirensuringaccounting:separation of  transmission and distributor activities from other 
, parts of the company· and  (iii)  ensuring that· appropriate  mechanisms .are  set  up  to 
prevent· confidential--information being passed by the transmission system operator to · 
other parts ofthe company. 
The management unbundling and  confiden~iality provisions of the Directive are crucial 
-·.  in- preventing the operator ofthe network fro_ni discriminating against potential t!Sers of 
the transm!ssion system.  ·  ·  ·  ·  .  -
M~t~agcmcnt  ·unbundling ·entails  in  practice that  the- day  to  day -management  of the 
net work  by the TSO must be indcpende11t from  commercial interests of t_he:-veJtically 
integrated company. Thus:  . 
·•  managers of the transinission·system should  not sit on the board of directors of 
the .company. The transmission part shoulc;l act-independently from the interests of 
...;  .  . the vertically integrated company;  .  . 
•  .  the tra~smission system operator should have all the necessary means and assets to 
maintain, ·develop  and :manage, the network,  especially  if the· .ownership •  of the -
network remains in the hands-of the vertically integrated company;. 
•  .,  the transmission  system  operator musLensure that it ,does·.not· disserninat~ a_ny · 
commercially  sensitive  information  from  other companies  to  other .in  his  own 
company.  Clear,  -'~Chinese .walls"  have to be put in  place to 'prevent this-flow of 
information·.·;·.- ) .  · 
The Directive requires. vertically integrated ;undertakings to keep- separate accounts for 
each of the activities of electricity, generation, .transmission, distrib.ution ·.and any other 
· non-electricity activities. These accounts should be published .and be. kept according to 
·a standard  accounting  practice.  The objective· of these· provisions  is  to  ensure  the 
necessary  tran~parency in  the operatio.n  of electricity undertakings with  the  view  to 
8 .-· 
avoid  any  cross subsidies  between the  different  activities  and  thereby  distortions  ql' 
competition.  This  important  obligation  will  prevent  companies  disguising  their 
allocation of costs.  Transparency is  seen in  this··Jight _as  an important p·recondition  fl.1r 
the effective application of  competition rules.  · 
All  Member States will  respect the provisions for separation of accounts in  vertic~lly 
integrated undertakings. Most member States have decided to legally separate the TSO -
from the vertically integrated company which is the most effective approach to ensure 
that  non-discrimination  is  taking  place.  Thus,  Spain,  the  UK  (England ·  &  Wales), 
Finland,  Sweden, Denmark -(west),  Austria (east), the Netherlands,  Portug-al,  Greece, 
Italy  and  Belgium have decided to appoint a ·separate legal entity as the transmission 
system operator. Denmark (east), Germany, France,  UK (Scotland &  N.  Ireland), and 
Austria (west) will  ensure that the TSO.is independent in  management terms without 
however appointing a separate legal entity.  Member States plans are illu-strated in  the 
following. table:  . 
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2.1.5  Public service 9bligations 
I ,iberali-sat ion  an~!  public  policy· are  not  I wo  contradictor'y  imperatives.  On ·t hl' 
cnJ~traiy, public service will  and  must play  an  important role in  a  liberalised  markc! 
This  approach  is  clearly  reflected  in  the  electricity  Directive,  which  provides  for  a · 
mechanism enabling Member States to pursue public pcilicy  considerations without  in 
noJmal  circumstances limiting the -liberalisation  process.  In  this  light  Member States 
can  define· public  service  obliga~ions  in  the· general  economic  interest  within  five 
categories,  related  to  'environmental  considerations, . security,  regularity,  quq.lity  of 
supply constraints and  prici~g policy considerations. They can then take the measUI:es 
necessa1y  to achieve  them.  What is. important is  that the measures and  mechanisms . 
Member States put In  place for the achievement 6f these objectives should hot restrict 
trade and competition more than necessary. 
Therefore,  supply  of electricity  to  geographically  isolated ·consumers  at  reasOI1able 
. -prices, obligations to provide,unprofitabie services, guaranteed· electricity supply to the 
· sick  'and  disabled,  limits  on  .the· possibility  of electricity  companies  to  disconnect 
· customers because of deb( and  ensuring continuity of electricity  supply  are and  will 
remain o61igations that can be met in  the context ofa:liberalised market. Governments 
can still impose on their distribution companies· an obligation ·to supply their customers. · 
·Member States have the choice to impose such. obligations ·on  ·an  operators in  tlieir 
country.  Nevertheless, these obligations should be objective, transparent and. imposed 
· on a non-discriminatory basis on all operators equally. 
- There  is  no  single· definition  of the  concept  of the  public _service  in. the  Union 
Ho·wevet, ·there  is  a  common set of provisions existing-in'almost all  Member States 
. designed to regulate the activities of electricity companies, which can be listed in  three 
. broad categories. 
-The first category .relates to the universal. service· and the, overall  protection of the 
·.  consumer.  In  this line specific provisions .exist in  most Member States, {s'uch ·as  AUS, 
D,  -FIN,  OK.  UK  GR,  SP,  POR,  B.  and  NL),  laying  down  obligations  to  co.nnect. 
customers,. and obligations to supply electricity on a regular basis to consumers. Some 
Member States such- as Austria also  lay  down  that  consumers  should  be charged  at 
· re~tsonable prices,  whereas, in  other countries such  as  France and  Greece~ regulated 
h  c;·.  ,tariffs-apply to captive. customers.  Furthermore,  special  provisions·are laid  down  m 
_some. countries-such. as the United Kingdom to protect the elderly and disabled. 
The · s.econd  · category  concerns  the  protection  ..  of >:the  ei1Vironment- , Specitl~ · 
environmental.'  constrains  · are  provided:·  for'.· .. electricity  generation  to ·.  ~nsme, 
environmental friendiy  electricity, production  (Germany,- Austria,  Denmark,<Greece) .. 
Support schemes for renewables and  combined heat and power are common ,place in-
- ·particular in  the area of R&TD.  Measures ·are  also  taken towards internalisation -of 
. e~ternal  costs for  instance  through  fiscal· measureSJ.- In  addition, . the  role . of cost 
effe<?tive  mechanisms .such as demand side management  '_and  energy .services are. being 
explored.  · ·  ·  - · 
: l ·1 >M)<J?":IO or 12JJ3.?7: 
10 The third category relates to security of supply considerations, which entail  technical 
specifications  for  all  those  connected  to the grid, main!enance of reserve  capacity, 
matching supply and demand, availability of  capacity to meet demand, securing primary 
'fuels for  electricitY generation,  land maintenance of  a secure and reliable system. 
The· Directiv.e,  therefore, gives Member States a wide margin of discretion in  deciding 
how  to _ensure  that public  service  obligations  are  met,  and  which  ones  to  pursue. 
Nonetheless,  the  objectives  and  approaches  pursued.  by  the  Member  States  are 
becoming increasingly similar.  Experience to-date indicates that as compet.ition  takes 
hold,  Member States require, and the companies meet,  increasingly high  standards in 
this  area.  Not only  must companies meet the minimum  standards legally  required  by 
Member States, it is  often in their commercial interest to exceed them.  This continued 
~nc1:ease in  the quality of public service is one of the basic underlying objectives of the 
Directive.  · 
2.1.6  Tnmsitional Regimes (  ..  stranded costs") 
The  introduction of competition  in  electricity  will  lead  to  lower  electricity_ prices. 
These  lower  prices  could  lead  to  serious·  financial  difficulties  for  producers  and 
s~ppliers who are at present faced with costs based on the situation before competition 
was introduced. 
These costs can take several forms, for instance: 
obligation's imposed on electricity companies in the past, for instance for social 
or environmental reasons leading_ to extra investments that can not be recuperated; 
fuel  and power purchase agreemen~s with a duration beyond  1999, which  have 
been concluded on the basis of  the expected price level  before liberalisation and would 
he too expensive under competitive Circumstances; 
St randcd costs are clearly not the costs. that are a result of  bad financial  managqmcnt or 
the company; they have to be clearly caused by the transition to competition. Normally 
these  above  mark.et  costs.· are a  result  9f government policy,  to favour .certain  li.1cls 
above others for instance.  To deal  with this issue the Directive provides for Member 
States to  notify  transitional  regimes to  the  Commission.  Such  regim.es  aim  to 
compensate  companies  for  these  extra  costs,  for  instance  by  limiting  the  market 
opening .to new entrants, to favour dispatch .of electricity from.  certain fuels,  or to give 
financial  c-ompensation.  P~rsuimt to the subsidiarity  princ:iple. it  is  for each Member · 
States to decide whether, an.d how much, it wishes to provide for a transitional regime.· 
It is equally for each country .to decide how to meet the resultant costs. However,- any 
such decision is subject to Commission control, either pursuant to the Oirective, or the 
state aid rules.  ·  ·  . 
Twelve  notific~tions have been  r~ceived by the  Commission.· Individual  decisions will 
have to be a~OP!~d for each country during the coming months. 
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2.2  SEC,ON() REP.ORT ON HARMONISATION REQUIREMENTS 
'·--
/\ccording to Article 2S  of the· Electricity, Directive,  the Commission  had  to .submit  "  ......  .  ..  .  . 
report to the Council_and to the European  P~trliament "l1n  hanm)nisatioo rcqlliremcnls in 
tlw i  ntcrnal market for electricity.  With regard to the ongoing im·plementation phase the 
Commission  decided  to  split  the  report  in  two  parts.  The  first  report,  delivered  in 
February  1998,  dealt  exclusively  with  the  issue  of promoting  renewables  in  the 
competitive  internal  electricity'  market..  As  a  consequence ·of this  report  and  the 
.following  discussionS,  the  Commission  is  now  conside~ing the  options. to  promote 
· inrn·ascd penetration of renewables in  the internal m~1rket for electricity. -
The seco~d harmonisation report
4 deals with
1
a broader range of  issues. -First,  it considers 
o.hslacles  foR;  cross-border. trade,  such  as  cross-border tarification  methodoiogy and 
settleinent, the operation of interconnectors, the management of available transmission 
capacity, the necessity to reinforce interconnection capacity, and the potential need for a 
common commercial-policy towards 3n
1 countries. A second set of issues addresses the 
necessity of ensuring a  level playing field in the European electricity ma,rkei afte•· 
libcn1lisation. This part discusses,  inter alia,  standards. related .  to decommissioning of 
nuclear plants, environmental standards in  electricity. producti9n
5 -and  taxation.  It raises 
the question whether the different levels of environmental and  other standards amongst 
Member  states,  based  on  EU ·legi·sJation  prior  to  liberalisation,  tend·  to  be  ·ton 
·' ·heterogeneous  in  the  light  of competition  after  liberalisation,. The ·taxation  chapter . · 
focuses  on  indirect  taxes,  in  particular on ·energy taxes. )t also. covers the question of 
·how-to treat ren.ewable based·electridtyand how to treal!imported.electricity·:  . .  · 
"Fhe  main  f4.)ci.as  of this  second  report  is  cross-border  trade.  This:  issue  has  been 
extensively  discussed  during  the  deliberations -of -the  Electricity. Regulation  Forum  in 
Florence  .. ·  At  the  meeting  of 8/9  October cross-border  tr~nsmission pricing  has  been 
recognised as a key issue,  and an -adequate solution of this issue is  the prerequisite for  . 
the, functioning of  a real single market in electricity. It had been agreed to. encourage the  . 
independent  transmission  system .  operators to  develop ·an. adequate  system of ~ross­
bord.er ·  tarification  and  settleinent.  .To  this  ,.  end;  the  ·Commission  invited  ·the 
representative independenttransmission system operators to Brussels on the ,2·1  January · 
..  '  ..... •: '1.999.  k.brcakthrough in  this difficult issue is  needed,  and,  important steps can. already 
:;~:  ·be recognised.  Otherwi~e. or maybe in  parallel, there. could be a clear need for·n\gulation . 
··.at the EU level.  Thus, the second harmoni"sation:has..the  fun~tion to support the:rapid 
·,  .  .implementation of  these .industry. arrangements;. and,' if-necessary,. to prepare· the:groui1d 
for regulatory action.  ., 
COtvi('J'J) 164.  l(..<l4. i999 
:;  ·Whilst-the entry into force.of the Directive will in .itself result in environmental benefits due to the  ··  ::. 
11Hroduction of more efficient and cleaner new gene~aling capacity,.additionalmcasuresto further improve 
Cll\ iron mental standards in this area can also play an important role in achieving the ELi's objectives in lhis 
1\:~pccl. 
i2 i 
' 
In  the White Paper on renewable sources of energy
6  it  is  stated. that renewable energy 
sources stillmakc. an .unacceptably modest contribution  to  the  Community's energy 
balance as compared to -the available technical  potentiaL  ln  1995  the contributimi of 
RES to the Union's overall gross inland  energy consumption was somewhat less than 
6'1~. The White Paper sets the indicative ambitious target of a doubling of the share of 
RES to -12% by 20 I  0.  This percentage is· all  the more ambitious since the major-pmt of 
the  current  6%  RES-share .  s!ems . from  large  hydro  for  which  the  development 
perspectives are very limited.  The Member States. have, agreed that there is  a  need to . 
. promote a sustained and substantially increased use of  RES throughout the Community 
and  have  welcomed  the White  Paper as  a  basis  for. the  development  of actions  at 
t'ommunity level complementary to actions at nationalleveP. 
The share in  electricity consumptic:m of electricity from-ren~wahle energy s()llrccs will 
incrcase signi licantly ovei· I he  coming ycars.  The lntemational  Energy  Agency (II':;\) 
has,  l(lr example, in  its World Energy .Outlook lor  llJ9~, projected that the increase in 
RES'-E  will  be far greater _than  in  conventionally generated electricity in  the Member 
States of  the European Union. 
This is confirmed by  indications received by. the Commission from the Member States. 
The tollo~ing  countri~S
8 have indicated targets for the growth'of renewables generated 
electricity (excluding large hydro, unless otherwise indicated):  Austria (3% in  2005, ), 
United Kingdom ( I  0% in  20 I  0,  incl.  large hydro),  Denmark (25% increase by 200), 
85% increase by 2030),  Finland (100 MW wind by 2005, 25% increase in  bioenergy 
by 2005), Greece (255-355 MW by 2003), Ireland (19,7% in  2010, incl.  large hydro), 
Portugal (837 MW by 2006), Spain (i200 MW by 2000).  . 
To achieve an  increase in  the generatioo of electricity from renewable energy sources, 
.. the  Member  States  have  adopted  diilerent  ways  of supporting  electricity  ho111 
· ·  n;newablc  energy  snui'ces.  The . European  {)nion,  with  the  adoption  of Diret:tivc 
I)(,/')2./I·:C  conceming con11non  rules  for  the  intemal  market  in  electricity,  is  in  the 
·  ·  pr()cess  of creal ing  a  single. market·. 1\.n  electricity.  The  integration  of tlw  elect rici l y 
. ·: niarkets i!nplies  that ·the support of' RES-E must be seen  in  the light of the internal 
market. 
·In  the  fir~t report·on Harmonisation requirements ·for  the internal electricity markee,. 
the Commission concluded that: 
r.  Eucrgy for the future:  renewable sources of  ene~gy. White paper for a Community strategy and action plan. 
COM(IJ7)5991inal.26.11.1997..  .  .. 
.  , Council  Resolution of X  June  IIJI)X; OJ C 1?8. 24-6-II)IJH.  c  .• 
"  l11  n:plics to a Commission questionnaire :1ddressed to all Member Stales in  I  ??X . 
.  , ( 'o111111issiou  report to the Council ";md  the European Parliament on Harinonisation  requirement~.  Directive 
'lt./'J'!. cmHxruiug rules fi.Jr 1  h~.:  iut~.:mal market  in  Electricity. COM(II)1)X) I(• 7,  1  h.O.l. 1  •)I)  X. 
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a  clear  need for  common  mles  in ·this  arect  can  already he  ident[jied.  l'ht! 
colllempormtedus existence of d{flerenl  sujJporl  schemes appears likely  to  result  i11 
distortions r!f' trade and competition,  The  role l!f' renewable.\' in the I~'{ J will  clear~v 
· increase in the com inK years, Kiven ,the Kyoto commitme1its.  Thus, potential market 
distortions  will  accordinKIY  increase..  Whilst  the  trade  and competition  disto(·ting 
effects of  different renewable support schemes is rather  limit~d a/ present,  Kive/i,Jhe 
fi~tiled i·:t ;' ',narkel  share  l!f' e!ectricily from renewable  sources, .this negative  eff~'c:t 
dppeai's  /ike~v  to  siKn(/ic:antly  ·inc:rease  in  the  cominK  ~yeais.  In· this  liKhl,  it  1s 
UfJfwot)riate  to  move .towards  the  definilion  (~(some common  rules  in  this area us 
rapidly as praclicahle". · 
It  is clear tl1at,  at present, 'the aisparate support schemes across the EU do not meet all  .  . 
these requirements. 
·In  the light of the above the Commission  has  adopted on 13 April  1999  a  Working. 
Paper
10 on this issue, examining the current support schemes in the Member States and 
indicating  in·  what. way this  issue  should  be  dealt  with  in  the  light.  of the  internal 
electricity market  ;  ·  · 
3.  GAS DIRECTIVE 98/30/ll:C 
The  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  adopted  on  22  June  1998  the .  Directive 
C)X/JO/EC''  on. common  rules  for  the  ir1ternal  market  in  natural  gas.  The  directive 
entered into f(xcc on ·1 0 August  1998.  Member States must implement it  by  I 0  August 
:woo . 
This  Dircdive  ll.mns  part  of the  lhmcwork  for  the  internal  energy  market  and 
represents a parallel of the Directive 96/92/EC. 
· It establishes some common rules for the trarismissi~n, distribution, supply arid storage 
of natural  gas.  The-,Directive  lays  down  the  rules  relating  to  the  organisation  and 
· functioning  of the natural gas sector,  including  liquefied  natural  gas,  access  to  the 
market,  the operati·on  of systems,  and .the  criteria: and  procedures applicable  to  the 
granting of authorisations for transmission, distribution,. supply and storage of natural 
gas 
3.1  KEYISSUES OF THE GAS DiRECTIVE 
3.1.1  Market Opening 
The  Directive ensures  that  the  market  wil\'be· opened to. competition  progressively, 
starting  with  a  lirst  significant  step that  will  guarantee that  the high  gas consuming 
industty will  be given the possibility to choose .freely its supplier.  In  a ten:-year  peri<,_ld 
.  . 
1''·SEC(99)~J70 final of 13  April1999. 
'' Directive 98/30/EC, O.J.E.C L 291 of21 July 199.8. 
.  14 the market will  be  liberalised  for  at  least  33% of the total  gas consumption  during 
three steps: 
I)  I  0 August 2000 
-* 
* 
All gas-tired power generators. 
Final consumers with a minimum 25  million m3 of  annual consumption 
This ·shall  lead to at least 20% market opening in each Member State.  In  case where 
market  opening  woul.d  exceed  30%;  Member  State  may  introduce supplementary 
thresholds to limit opening to 30%. 
2) 
* 
* 
I  0 August 2003 
All gas-fired power generators 
Final consumers with minimum 15  million m3 of  annual consumption 
This .shall  lead to at least 28% market .opening in  each Member State.  In case where 
market  opening  would  exceed  30%, ·Member  State  may  introduce  suppleme.ntary 
thresholds to limir opening to 30%.  · 
3)  I  0 August 2008 
*  Ali gas-fired power generators 
*  Final consumers with minimum 5 million m3 of  annual consumption 
This shall  lead to at  least  33% market opening in  each  Member State.  In  case where 
market  opening  would  exceed  30%,  Member  State  may  introduce· supplementary 
thresholds to limit opening to 30%. 
Member. States may  introduce,  in  order to  safeguard the balance of t~eir electricity 
market, a th~eshoid for eligibility of combined heat and power producers (CHP), ·which 
in any case .;;annot exceed the threshold for final customers. 
3.1.2  Access to the System 
)  . 
Eligible customers will have the possibility to negotiate and conclude supply contracts 
with any natural gas undertakings, being inside or outside the territory of  the Member 
State·.  Access to the system for the execution of  these contracts will be. possible on the 
basis of two procedures (negotiated access or regulated access), the choice being left 
to  the  Member States.  Both procedures must  operat~ in  accordance with  objective, 
transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. 
Where  Member States opt tor the negotiated  Third  Party  Access  the  conditions  for 
access -to the system are negotiated with the responsibl.e natural gas undertaking. These 
undertakings are requ~red to publish the main commercial conditions for the use of  the 
system. 
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l Jn~lc'r  _a  · ileg()tiated  Third  Party  Access;  eligible  customers  iu~d  natural · ;.as 
-undcriakings  have a  right  of access  to  the system,  on  tlie  basis  t>f  published  tarills 
and/or other terms and obligations for use of  that system. 
Access to the system may only be refused in case oflack of capacity, when this would 
. impede gas undertakings to carry out some public service obligations,  and  when this 
would  create  some  serious  economic  and- fimincial  problems  with  take-or-pay 
obligations. 
In  case·where a dispute would adse on the conditions for ·access to the system, it will 
be possible to refer the case to'  a dispute settlement authority that shall be appointed 'by 
·.  Member States.:  · 
Member  States have  the  possibility  to  establish different .rules  for the access to  the 
upstream  pipeline network,  to take into  account  the possible specific economic and 
technical. characteristics of this  part of  the network.  Member States· must ensure that-
th~.:se rules guarantee a fair and  ;?pen  acces~ and. a co!npeti!ive market· in  natural  gas. 
avoiding any :abuse of  a ·dominatit position.  -
~.1.3  .lJ nbundling · 
The accounts of all  integrated gas ·undertakings must be as transparent as  possible,  in  _ 
particular in  ord~r to detect any abuse of a dominant position such as abnonnally low · 
or high  tariffs. or discriminatory practices for  equivalent  services.  To this end,  these 
undertakings must keep in their.iriternal accounting  s~parate ac~ou~ts for th~ir natural 
gas  transmission,  distribution  and  storage  activities,  and,'  where  ~appropriate, 
consolidated  accounts for  n_on-gas  activities.  These  internal  accounts  will· include  a 
· balance shf?et and a profit and loss account ~or each activity  . 
. Moreover, to avoidthe risk  of potential  discrimination between users,  it  is  essential 
.that  transmiSSIOn,  distribution,  storage  and  LNG  undertakings  ensure.  the 
conlidential_ity  of commercially  sensitive  information  in  the  co~rse of their business, 
and tints the Directive requires_ that they shall  not,  in  the context of sales or purchases 
or natural  gas by  the  transmission  undertakings,· distribution  undertakings or'  related 
undertakings  abuse  commercially. sensitive  information· obtained  in -the  context  of 
providing or negotiating access to th_e system  .. 
3.1.4 · Public  Se~ice  Obligations 
Member States have the right to impose on natural gas undertakings public service 
obligations in  th~ general  economic interest.  These  obligations  must fall  within  the 
framework  of five  specific-areas:  security,  including  security  of ·supply,  regularity, 
quality,  price of  supply and protection of  the environment Whatever these obligations 
are, Member States must _ensure  that they are established under objective, transparent 
and  non-discriminatory  criteria.  Member  States  will  communicate  them to  the . 
16 Commission  which  will  verity the compatibility of these provisions with' Community 
law.  In  any case, Member States must ensure that these measures represent the  least 
restrictive in terms of  competition.  ·  · 
3.1.5  Derogations . 
Under specific circumstances, the Directive establishes possibilities for Member States 
to derogate from the application of  the rrtain ·provisions.  These derogations,  specified 
·under Chapter VII of  the Directive, have been introduced in  order to taRe into account 
potenti.al  fisks or -disto.rtions that could be endangered by  the liberalisation of the gas 
. market.  .  . 
3.1.5.1 Take-or-pay contracts·· 
Today, the vast inajority ofthe gas supply in  the European Union-is contracted under long 
lcnn take-or:-pay  contracts concluped  between  gas  supply  undertakings  and  producers. 
These contracts are characterised by a Clause obliging the purchaser to pay for a specific 
volume of  gas regardless of  whether the gas is taken or not. 
The  Directive provides that,  if a  natural  gas undertaking encounters or considers  it 
would encounter serious economic and financial difficulties because of its take-or-pay 
commitments  accepted  in  one  or more  gas  purchase  contracts,  it  may  apply  for  a 
temporary derogation from the requir.ement to. grant access to the system, which  can 
be granted by  the Member States and then submitted to the final  determination of the· 
- Commission. 
·1-Jowever,  a number of  conditions must be applied to evaluate if it is necessary to grant 
a derogation  from  access  or  if  other  alternative  measures,  'less  restrictive  or 
wmpctition, can be taken.  In  any  case,  a derogation can be presented only  when  the 
overall  gas  sales  or the  gas  undertaking  fall  below  the  level  of minimum  Qtllakc 
guarantees included in the take-or-pay contr~ct.  . 
3.1.5.2 Non-interconnected countries 
As  l~ng as  Member  States  have  no  connection  with  the  interconnected  system  of 
another Member States and have only one main external supplier (with a market share 
exceeding  75%)  they  may  derogate  from  the  application  of some  articles  of the 
Directive, including authorisations for gas facilities and direct lines and the obligation 
in terms of  eligi~le customers. At present, two Member States, Finland and Greece, fall 
under these  conditions,  and  will  have  to  notifY  the  Commission  of the  intention  to 
make  use of this  derogation.  However;  when· these  conditions  would  not  be  filled. 
derogations would automatically e~pire.  . 
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( 'ountrics where gas· has been inti·oduced only recently could have substantial problcn;s 
. resulting from the implementation'of the Directive and tlie introduction of  compeiiti~n 
in  a  developing  market.  These countries  are  considered  emergent  markets  and  may 
therefore benefit from  a derogation from  the application of the niain  provisions of the 
· Directive.· The conditions under which Member States cari  be considered eniergent is 
that the first supply of  the first Icing-term gas contract in their market have been made 
not  more  than ten  years  earlier.  Greece  and  Pprtugal  fall  at  present  under .  these 
conditions. 
3.1.5.4 Emergent areas which could benefit from th_e encouragement of investments 
.Membef  States have the possibility to·  request derogations for geographically limited 
areas where gas infrastructure has not yet been established or has been in operation for 
·l.css than  I  0 years, in a view to encourage new investments and upon the· condition that 
iinplemcntation ofthe Directive would cause substantial problel'ns in  such areas. 
.  . 
These  derogations, _granted  by  the  Commission,  cannot be  _prese~ted in  relation  to 
investments in  the distribution  sector but only to other investments  in  the. gas sector 
and in  partictdar in  relation to transmission infrastructure. 
3.2  ·STATE OF LlliERALISATION 
.  .  .  ~ 
. The gas market will be opened to competition progressively, during a·ten-year period, 
. to  reach in  2008 at least 3  ~%:of  the total gas consumption, However, due to the  fa~( 
that the eligibility of alL power generators and of large industrial customers will result 
in  a higher market opening in some Member States, the real level of  mark~t opening at 
EU level wili exceed the initial minimum level of20%. In fact,  ahnost 33% bfthe total 
~  . 
EU  gas  market  will  be  liberalised  from  the  beginning:  Moreover,  several 'Member 
States  wilr not  limit  the  opening  of their· gas  market  to  the  mmunum  thresholds 
established by the (ias dir:ectivc.  · 
The United Kingdom has already totally liberalised its gas market since May I 998, on 
the basis of. a system of fixed  tariffs for access {Regulated TPA). Ireland has  opened 
.  the market for customers consuming more· than 25  million  m3  per year.  {n  Germany, 
· since April  I  998 all customers are legally free to choose their supplier on the basis of a 
Negotiated  TPA· system.  Spain  has  adopted  iri  October  1998  ·a  new  legislative 
framework that will  permit it to progressively liberalise all  the market in  2013, with a· 
first  46% of the  market  already  opened  since  1998.  In  Belgium. a  law  should  be 
·adopted shortly opening 46,7% of the gas market to competition. The Netherlands is, 
planning to liberalise by 2000 45% of  the market and  to open it  completely -in  2007  . 
. The other Member States will  submit shortly their proposals for implementation, but 
. on the basis of these preliminary figures it is  already possible to calculate that,  ~s for 
electricity,  the .liberalisation  of the ga's  market  is  becoming  a  reality  throughout  all 
.  .  / 
Europe. 
•  18 4.  CONCLUSIONS 
J\t  present  there  is  every _reason  to  be  optimistic  regarding  the  creation of a  single 
market for electricity and gas.  With respect to the Electricity  Directive~ mos~ Member 
States  have  fully  and  properly  implemented  the  Directive,  and  they  have  chosen 
stru<;:tur~s and approaches that will  ensure that competition is  effective, while in  most 
cases they liberalise far more rapidly than is  required by  the Directive.  Already,  prices 
in  E~rope  are beginning to fall, as can be seen from the following graphs: 
Gnt11h  I %. modilicatioit of 1997(2) compared to  1994 electricity prices for industrial consumers 
(I o Gwh annual consumption) prices in national currency/kwh, VAT excluded, prices deflated 
Gra11h 2% modification of)  998 electricity prices compared to 1994 for household consumers (7500 
Kwh annual consl!lnption), Prices in national currency/KWh, tax included, prices deflated 
Graph 2 
Furthermore, the adoption of the Gas Directive represented another major step for the 
creation of a single energy market. Member States by August 2000 will  have to open 
up their markets to competition for consumers representing at least 20 % of their gas 
· market. Member States are now in  the process of transposing the Directive into their 
national laws.  The Commission is closely following the implementation process of the 
Gas Directive. At present no major difficulties are likely to arise. 
ln the future the correct implemen-tation of the Gas pir.ective by Member States and. 
monitoring  the  operation of the  Electricity  Directive  in  practice  will  be  in  the  top 
priorities of  the Union. lt is vital to ensure that these rules ~re equally and fairly applied 
by the establishment of  efficient regulatory mechanisms .. 
19 I' 
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This  regulatory  role  will  be  carried  oul  in  partnership  between  national  re~ulato1s, 
competition authorities, and the European Commission. The Electricity Directive itself 
requires the Member States to set up  a dispute  settlement at1thority,  independent  of 
: electricity  companies.  However,  most  Member  States  have ·chosen  to  establish  an 
. Independent  regulator,  immediately  and. 'on  a  day.,to-day  basis  independ~nt o(  but. 
ultimately  responsible  to,  Government.  In 'any event,  it  is  evident  that  a  clear and 
increasing .understanding across the EU exists of the need for  effective regulation  in 
this area, whilst subjecting companies to the rriinimum red tape possible: . 
Evidently, the implementation of the Electricity Djrective is  not the last step towards 
the creation of  a single electricity market. The Directive lays down the groundwork for 
. the 'liheralisation of 15  electricity markets ..  Nevertheless,· much remains to be done to 
achieve a  single  market  for  electricity.  In  this  line  the  remai~ing barriers' to  intra-
·community trade should be identi.fied and eliminated. Furthern1ore, .the Com~ission, in 
close  collaboration with  the.  Member  States  and  the  electricity  industry;.  should  .  - '  . 
establish  more  coherent principles concerning a  range of unresolved  issues that  can 
block· cross-:-border  trade.  The  development. of tariff systems  al1d  trade  facilitating 
mcchanisn,ls  l~)  enable  the .single  market  to  become  etfective. is th_us  of utmost 
importance,  and  will' be  the -principal  challenge that  the Commission,  together  with  . 
·national  authonties  and  Europe's  transmission  and  distribution  industries,  will  be· 
dealing with in the coming months and years. 
Furthermore,  the  Union  should  take  action· to  promote  electricity  generated  from 
renewable energy sources with 'the view to increase green electricity in  a 'substantial 
and sust.ainable way; and increasing attention will need to be paid to the environmental 
·dimension of  the internal energy market to meet EU environmental objectives. 
In  addition,  the  employment  effects  of the 'liberalisation  of the  electricity  and  gas 
markets will· need  to  be addressed by Member States and  the  Uni~n in  cooperation. 
with social partners. 
The  Commission  will  also  examine  the  consumer  dimension  of the  liberalisation 
process, especially its  impact on  residential  consumers and  how the provisions put  in . 
place to guarantee un}vcrsal service and the protection of  consumers are functioning. 
Last but not least  in  the prospect of enlargement of the EU in. the coming years the 
Union should ensure the smooth transition to a wider single market for electricity and 
gas.  In· this  respect  the ·corhmission  w~ll  implement  a  speCific  technical  assistance 
programme vis-a-vis  candidate countries for accession  to the EU with  the  view  to 
ensure that the Union seizes all  the opportunities from  a wider single energy market 
· and that all  achievements towards European integration in  the energy sector are not · 
endangered.  · 
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